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Why are they drawn to these battles . . . ? The challenge

of the chess game partly. The thrill of battle. Greed, of
course. Like professional mercenaries, most are for hire by
either side. They fight their campaigns in an arena rampant
with white knights, poison pills, springing warrants, and
hostile front-end loaded bust-up tender offers. And they are
in it to win.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is in the midst of its fourth major merger and
acquisition boom of the twentieth century.? Depictions of battles for
corporate control more closely resemble guerilla warfare than the com1.

M. JOHNSTON, TAKEOVER 1-2 (1987) (describing the takeover "warriors" of Wall Street).

2.

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF

ECONOMIC ADVISERS in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO THE

CONGRESS 192 (Feb. 1985). The first three waves peaked respectively at the beginning of the
twentieth century, during the five year period preceding the Great Depression of the 1930s,
and during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Id.; see also D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER,
MERGERS, SELL-OFF, & ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
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plicated contests actually taking place in the nation's financial markets
and courtrooms. Of all the current business combinations, public attention has focused largely on "hostile takeovers," which occur when
corporate management resists acquisition by outside parties.
Management of the corporation under attack in the hostile takeover
attempt (the 'target") often undertakes a defensive strategy to thwart
the acquirer. One of the most controversial takeover defenses is the
payment of "greenmail" 3 to the bidder. The target prevents the hostile
takeover by repurchasing shares held by the bidder at a premium
4
over the market price.
There are three main criticisms of greenmail. First, it is unfair to
the remaining shareholders whose shares are not cashed out at a
premium. Second, it entrenches existing management. Finally, it is
an ineffective takeover defense because the payment of greenmail to
one "raider" does not ensure that a second greemnailer will not
emerge.6 Some commentators defend greenmail payments as ultimately benefitting all target shareholders by "actually improv[ing] the
price shareholders receive in tender offers by facilitating an auction
market for a firm's stock."'6 These defenders of greenmail further argue
that payments provide "an efficient means of compensating those who
supply valuable information to the market (or the firm) about the
'7
value of a firm's stock."
Historically, greenmail has been subject to judicial review and
more recently state legislative control.8 Prior to the Tax Reform Act
of 19869 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987,10 federal
tax law generally has not affected greenmail payments. In one case,
however, a court allowed a corporation a full current deduction for
repurchasing its own stock., This general tax neutrality ended,

3. Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J.
13 (1985); Comment, Greenmail: Can the Abuses be Stopped?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1271, 1274
(1986).
4. Macey & McChesney, supra note 3, at 13 n.1; Comment, supra note 3, at 1275. The
term greenmail originates from 'its similarity to blackmail and the use of a cash payment
('green') for the shares." Comment, supra note 3, at 1275.
5.

See R. FERRARA, M. BROWN, J. HALL & J. RIcHMAN, TAKEOVERS ATTACK AND

SURvVAL: A STRATEGISVS MANUAL 413 (1987) [hereinafter R. FERRARA & M. BROWN].

6. Macey & McChesney, supra note 3, at 15.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
9. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 [hereinafter "the 1986 Act"].
10. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
[hereinafter "the 1987 Act"].
11. Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966). See also infra notes
137.40 and accompanying text (discussion of tax treatment prior to the 1986 Act).
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though, in two stages. First, section 162()(1), as added by the 1986
Act, disallows any deduction "for any amount paid or incurred by a
corporation in connection with the redemption of its stock."'' Second,
the 1987 Act added section 5881, which levies a 50 percent excise tax
on the receipt of greenmail. 13 These excursions by the tax law into
the arena of hostile takeovers and greenmail payments raise policy
questions as to whether federal tax law should regulate hostile takeovers by regulating certain hostile takeover defenses.
This paper does not focus on the propriety of greenmail but rather
examines the role of tax law in regulating hostile takeovers, particularly greenmail. It begins with a general survey of hostile takeovers
and takeover defenses, as well as the general effect of federal tax law
on takeovers and defenses. It then addresses section 5881. First, it
examines the statutory requirements. Then, it analyzes the underlying
policy, focusing on the propriety of using the Internal Revenue Code
to discourage certain economic and social behavior. The paper concludes that the use of federal tax law to discourage greenmail transactions violates tax policy goals, and such violations are not justified
by this overly broad, punitive statute.
II.

HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND THE USE OF GREENMAIL

A.

Hostile Takeovers Generally

Mergers of publicly held companies generally occur because "both
buyers and sellers consider themselves to be better off from the merger
transaction than without it."1 4 Management of the corporations involved usually negotiate the merger transaction, and the acquired
corporation's management generally recommends the merger to its
shareholders for their approval. 5
Although most mergers are voluntary, some corporate acquisitions
result from the takeover process where the acquirer seeks to gain
control over the target corporation by making a "tender offer" to the
target's shareholders.16 The takeover process becomes hostile if the
target's management opposes the offer.' 7

12.
are to
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

I.R.C. § 1620)(1) (added by § 613 of the 1986 Act). Except as otherwise noted, all cites
the 1986 Code, as amended through 1988.
Id. § 5881(a) (added by § 10228 of the 1987 Act).
D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER, supra note 2, at 2.
Id. at 68.
L. Loss, FuNDAMENTALs OF SECURITIES REGULATION 568 (1983).
D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER, supm note 2, at 68.
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1. Hostile Takeover Mechanics
A hostile takeover often begins when a potential acquirer identifies
a publicly traded stock that the market is undervaluing.18 Then, the
potential acquirer generally buys up to 5 percent of the target's outstanding stock on the open market. The potential acquirer can generally accomplish a 5 percent purchase anonymously. Thus, this limited
purchase does not significantly affect the market price of the stock. 19
Once the potential acquirer reaches 5 percent ownership, section
13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193420 requires the filing
of certain disclosures with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). The acquirer must make required disclosures within ten days
of reaching the 5 percent threshold. The disclosures must include the
percentage of the filer's ownership in the corporation and any plans
2
to liquidate, sell, merge, or otherwise change the corporate structure, '
as well as any takeover plans. This ten day "window" before disclosure
allows the acquirer to purchase additional stock anonymously before
the market adjusts to the SEC filing and the public's expectation that
a takeover might occur.2 After the SEC filing, many shareholders
will sell if the stock's market price rises in anticipation of a takeover.
The purchasers of this stock are often "risk arbitrageurs" whose "objective is generally to earn a profit of a few points per share based
on the difference between the ultimate takeover price and the market
price for the stock after it is known that a takeover attempt is immi-

nent."23
After reaching the 5 percent "toehold," the potential acquirer
might either hold the stock, engage in a friendly advance to the target's
management (affectionately known as a "bear hug strategy"25), or com-

18. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., TAX TREATMENT OF
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TAXATION AND DEBT MGMT.
18 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter TAx TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS]. Undervalued
is defined as 'trading ... below underlying net asset value." Id.
19. Id. at 19.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988). This provision is part of the Williams Act,
which was enacted in 1968 to "alert the marketplace to every large, rapid accumulation of

securities... that might represent a shift in corporate control." R.

FERRARA

& M. BROWN,

supra note 5, at 40-41.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
22.

See TAX TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 19.

23. Id. It is important to note that the risk arbitrageur is not a historic shareholder and
is mainly interested in seeing that the takeover is ultimately accomplished by someone. Id. at 20.
24. See F. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supraz note 5, at 37.
25. Id. at 64.
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mence a "tender offer." A tender offer involves a public offer to
purchase all or part of the target's outstanding shares at a premium
over market price.Y
2. Takeover Defenses
Management typically opposes takeovers for several reasons. They
may believe their corporation has "hidden values," or that such resistance will increase the eventual offer price. They may merely want to
protect their jobs.m Simply defined, "[t]akeover defenses include all
actions by managers to resist having their firms acquired."' This
broad definition can be classified into two types of takeover defenses:
preventative (pre-offer defenses) and reactionary (post-offer defenses).30
a. Preventative
Pre-offer defenses are generally used as a protective measure to
make a corporation less attractive to a potential acquirer. One such
defense is adoption of a "golden parachute agreement." A golden
parachute is generally an agreement that "provide[s] for lucrative
payments to key executives in the event of change in corporate ownership or control."3s Because these payments increase the cost of a
takeover, golden parachutes presumably discourage takeover attempts. Such arrangements also help attract and retain quality managers to an employment situation that might otherwise be precarious
due to takeover risk.32

26. Tender offers are generally regulated by the Williams Act, which amended the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. See The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 521.
27. R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 22.
28. Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (A. Auerbach ed. 1988).

29.

Id. at 49.

30. Id. at 53 n.61.
31. Comment, Golden Parachutesand DraconianMeasures Aimed at Control: Is Internal
Revenue Code Section 280G the Proper Regulatory Mode of Shareholder Protection?, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1293 (1986).

Presumably, golden parachutes have lost some of their appeal as a result of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, which enacted § 280G, disallowing any deduction for excess parachute
payments, and § 5999, imposing a 20% excise tax on the recipient of excess parachute payments.
See I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999, as added by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 67(a), (b)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 585-87 [hereinafter the "1984 Act"]. See also infra notes 98-118 and

accompanying text (discussion of the taxation of golden parachute arrangements).
32. Comment, supra note 31, at 1295-96.
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Another pre-offer defense is the use of "shark repellants." These
are amendments to the target's articles of incorporation and bylaws
intended to discourage hostile takeovers.s One common amendment
is a "super-majority provision,"s4 which increases the percentage of
shares otherwise required to approve transactions such as mergers.
Alternatively, some corporations adopt "fair price amendments,"a'
which require the bidder to pay the same price to all tendering
shareholders.
The most recent, and perhaps most controversial, preventative
defense is the 'poison pill."a- Although actual plans vary,F7 the basic
plan requires that a corporation declare a dividend to its common
shareholders. The dividend provides either a right to buy additional
shares of stock of the issuing corporation or of any hostile bidder for
the issuer. Stockholders may exercise the rights generally on announcement of a hostile tender offer. When the rights are issued, the
exercise price is higher than the market price of the underlying stock.
The "poison" is injected when the bidder seeks to complete a merger
after acquiring a large portion of the target. The holders of the rights
would then be entitled to exchange each right for a greater value of
the target's or the bidder's common stock.-s Accordingly, the bidder
dilutes its own equity as it acquires stock subject to a poison pill. 39
b. Reactionary
Once the takeover bid has been threatened or actually made and
the target's management has decided that the offer is inadequate,
management will take any of a number of post-offer defensive measures to fight off the bidder.
The payment of "greenmail" is among the most controversial reactionary defensive measures. 40 Greenmail, or "targeted stock repur33. Comment, suprm note 3, at 1273 n.17.
34. See id.
35.

These amendments are aimed at preventing "two-tier tender offers" where the first

tier price is substantially higher than the second. Such a tender offer results in the bidder
effectively paying a price between the tiers because most shareholders tender early as a result
of the incentive of receiving the first tier price, and the bidder accepts the shares on a pro rata

basis. Ruback, supra note 28, at 58.
36. See id. at 59.
37. 'Poison pills come in different packages but contain essentially similar toxins." R.
FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 200.
38. Id. at 200-01. For example, the exchange rate might be 2 to 1. Id. Under such terms,

$100,000 worth of common stock of the target can be exchanged for $200,000 of the bidder's
common stock. See id.
39. Id. at 201.
40. COUNCIL OF ECONoMIc ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 209; see supr notes 3-4 and
accompanying text.
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chase," 41 is the target's payment for the repurchase of shares held by
a potential acquirer.4 A target pays to eliminate a threatening shareholder or to avert a hostile takeover.4 Increased use of greenmail as
a takeover defense is attributed to the growing trend of "corporate
raiders" gaining large "toeholds" in potential targets through open
market purchases until they attain a threatening position. 44
A "standstill agreement" is a defense closely resembling greenmail.
The payment, however, is not for the repurchase of shares. Rather,
it is for a contractual agreement between the potential acquirer and
the target that limits the former's ownership for a specified period of
time.4 5 This defense also differs from greenmail because the bidder in
a standstill agreement may continue the takeover attempt after the
expiration of the agreement.
Another common reactionary defense is the use of a "white knight."
In order to defeat the bid by a hostile bidder, the target persuades
a third party to merge with it, or make a competing tender offer to
the shareholders. 46 The target may prefer merger with the white
knight over the hostile bidder for a variety of reasons. For example,
the white knight might make a better offer or be better suited to run
the business. 47
B. Greenmail
1. The Greenmail Controversy
Although most commentators agree that greenmail is harmful, no
consensus of opinion exists . The arguments against greenmail focus
on its lack of fairness and effectiveness. The concern with fairness
relates to use of corporate assets to cash out the potential acquirer
at a higher price than the remaining shareholders can obtain on the

41. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supranote 2, at 209; supra text accompanying
notes 3-4.
42. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supranote 2, at 210; R. FERRARA & M. BROWN,
supra note 5, at 413.
43. R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 413.
44. Comment, supra note 3, at 1275. Such purchases are used to try to avoid the stricter
requirements of Williams Act. Id. See supratext accompanying notes 18-24 (discussion of obtaining a toehold position).
45. See Ruback, supra note 28, at 63 (analogizing a standstill agreement to a treaty);
Comment, supra note 3, at 1274 n.18.
46. L. Loss, supra note 16, at 570.
47. R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 461.
48. See Gilson, Drafting an Effective GreenmailProhibition, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 329, 330
n.3 (1988).
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market. 49 Commentators assert this "exploitive" behavior should not
be allowed.0 An SEC study on the effect of greenmail on target stock
prices concluded that the non-participating shareholders bear the direct economic burden of the target's payment of greenmail.1
Another fairness concern deals with the payment of greenmail in
order to "entrench" management's control and preserve their jobs. 62
Empirical evidence indicates that non-participating shareholders suffer
from the use of greenmail as an entrenchment device. 3 Therefore, as
with the exploitation issue, non-participating shareholders bear the
economic burden of the benefits enjoyed by management.
A third criticism of greenmail relates to its effectiveness as a
takeover defense. The payment of greenmail to one raider does not
necessarily preclude a greenmail attempt by a second raider. This
49. See R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 413.
150. "From the perspective of the antitakeover forces, greenmailers are the worst example
of exploitive, opportunistic players in the market for corporate control, threatening an acquisition
that has no efficiency justification (and may impose significant costs) simply to garner short-term
gains." Gilson, supra note 48, at 331.
51. In a study of eighty-nine cases of targeted repurchases involving publicly traded companies, the SEC found that
[t]he evidence suggests that non-participating shareholders suffer substantial and
statistically significant share price declines upon the announcement of targeted
repurchases at premium above market value. The overall impact on share prices
from the date the initial foothold position is established to the date the block is
repurchased is also negative. The appreciation in stock prices caused by the initial
foothold acquisition is more than offset by the decline in stock prices in response
to events subsequent to the initial acquisition, on average.
We conclude that the overall impact of targeted share repurchases on the wealth
of non-participating shareholders is negative.
Office of the Chief Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission, The Impact of
Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,713, at 87,174 (Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter "SEC Study on Greenmail"].
52. This theory is called "the managerial welfare theory." Id. at 87,179.
53. The SEC also found that
[tihe possibility that a targeted share repurchase can mutually benefit the incumbent management and the block seller while harming the other shareholders arises
because the benefits of changing control flow largely to the non-participating target
shareholders. The dissent blockholder benefits through his share ownership by a
third-party takeover at a premium. But, the great majority of the benefits go
elsewhere, to other target shareholders principally. It becomes possible, therefore,
for incumbent management to offer a relatively more lucrative payment to the
dissident block-holder, even if the best interests of all shareholders are served by
a change of control.
Id. (emphasis added).
54. See R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 414 (noting a situation where a target
company, after paying off two greenmailers, sought a white knight when a third greenmailer
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"double-dipping" occurs because the target's stock price usually declines after the market reacts to the stock repurchase.s If the price
declines enough, the stock may become undervalued and the entire
takeover process can begin again,56 resulting in another threatened
takeover and more greenmail. When this double-dipping occurs, the
payment of greenmail appears to be a waste of corporate assets rather
than an effective takeover defense.
Other commentators assert, however, that greenmail is not bad
and that it even benefits non-participants. The first pro-greenmail
argument is that the price increase generated by the bidder's initial
purchase is greater than the subsequent price decline resulting from
the repurchase. 57 Another pro-greenmail argument is that it creates
an "auction market" for the target's stock. Accordingly, greenmail
improves the eventual price shareholders receive in a tender offer.5
A further justification for greenmail is that it provides market
information regarding the target's value and its vulnerability to
takeover. 9 Such information might lead to more takeover attempts,
with the shareholders receiving the overall net gain of price increases
over decreases. Under this theory, greenmail constitutes compensation
to the greenmailer for providing information to the market.6
2. Current Regulatory Scheme
a. Federal
Presently, federal securities law regulation of greenmail and many
of the other takeover defenses is limited to requiring disclosure.
Among the amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act") made by the Williams Act in 1968, are sections 13(d) 61 and 14(e). 2

threatened); Comment, supranote 3, at 1276 n.41 (describing an instance where a target company
paid a greenmail payment of over $89 million to one greenmailer and less than two months later
paid a dissident shareholder another greenmail payment of over $25 million).
55. R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 413.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27 (discussion of the mechanics of a hostile
takeover).
57. See Ruback, supra note 28, at 63. "Overall, the total return associated with these
transactions, including the initial investment, intervening events, and targeted repurchase is
7%." Id.
58. Macey & McChesney, supra note 3, at 15.
59. Id.; see COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 210.
60. Macey & McChesney, supra note 3, at 15.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
62. Id. § 78n(e).
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These sections are generally applicable to greenmail and other

takeover defensess Section 13(d) requires disclosure within ten days
of attaining a 5 percent ownership interest in a publicly traded corporation.4 Section 13(d) also requires the purchaser to disclose whether
it intends to acquire control or make changes in the corporate structure.6 Consequently, a greemnailer must file this disclosure. Section
14(e) is a general anti-fraud provision aimed at preventing omissions,

misstatements of material facts, or other manipulative acts in connection with a tender offer.66 In addition to enforcing sections 13(d) and
14(e), the SEC uses other disclosure requirements to bring actions
against corporations for failing to disclose payment of greenmail.67
The limited role of federal securities law on greenmail will increase
under proposed legislation. Under some of the bills, shareholders must

approve greemnails Another proposed bill prohibits greenmail entirely.69 The passage of these and other anti-takeover proposals, however, remains doubtful at the present time. 70
b. State
i. Judicial Relief
A shareholder may challenge management's decision to pay green-

mail in a state court action. Generally, the shareholder's cause of

63. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1295.
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
65.

Id. § 78m(d)(C).

66. See id. § 78n(e).
67. The case of In re BF Goodrich Co. involved an administrative hearing by the SEC
against the BF Goodrich Company for alleged failure to disclose in its annual Form 10-K and
proxy statement the payment of $41 million in greenmail (representing a 25% premium) to a
limited partnership owned almost entirely by financier Carl Icahn. Exchange Act Release No.
22,792, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 83,958, at 87,991, 87,992 (Jan.
15, 1986) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 22,792]. The Form 10-K allegations involved
§ 13(a) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). The alleged proxy violations involved § 14(a)
of the 1934 Act. Id. § 78n(a). In this action, BF Goodrich offered to settle without admitting
or denying the allegation. The SEC accepted this offer. Exchange Act Release No. 22,792,
supra, at 87,995.
68.

See H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 133 CONG. REC. H1562-63 (1987); S. 1323,

100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 133 CONG. REC. S7601-02 (1987).
69. S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10, 133 CONG. REC. S7666, S7669 (1987).
70. R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 421. Indeed, even if such legislation
passes Congress, the Reagan Administration would likely be in opposition. See President's State
of the Union Address 28, reprinted in TAX NoTES WEEKLY MICROFICHE, Doc. 88-906 (Jan.
25, 1988).
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action is based on a theory of breach of fiduciary duty.71 Under the
common law of most states, corporate directors and management owe
a duty of loyalty and a duty of care to the corporation and its shareholders. The twin duties of loyalty and care generally require that directors and management prudently and diligently obtain adequate information for their decisions. Directors must also make the best decision
for the corporation.7 Most state courts treat the decision of whether
and how to defend against a takeover as a business decision of the
corporation. Accordingly, the "business judgment rule" protects management and directors from liability if they meet their fiduciary duties
of loyalty and care.7 The Supreme Court of Delaware recently articulated the business judgment rule as an
[a]cknowledgement of the managerial prerogatives of [the
target's] directors .... It is a presumption that in making

a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
. ..Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be
respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the
decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.74

The business judgment rule is generally applicable to the target
directors' decision to pay greenmail. In the seminal case of Cheff v.
Mathes,7s the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the board of directors of the target corporation were not liable for their decision to
repurchase, at a premium, the stock of a shareholder whom the board
felt was threatening.76 Acceptance of the business judgment rule in a
greenmail context, however, is not universal. Applying a stricter
standard than the traditional business judgment rule, a California
court upheld a preliminary injunction prohibiting the payment of green-

71.

R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 274; Comment, supra note 3, at 1278.

72. R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 276; Comment, supra note 3, at 1278.
73. R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supra note 5, at 276-77.
74. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
75. 41 Del. Ch.494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
76. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556 (although the articulated standard was virtually identical
to the business judgment rule, it was not labelled as such). For a more recent application of
the business judgment rule to greenmail, see Heine v. The Signal Cos., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,898, at 91,311, 91,322 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1977) (absolving
directors from liability upon showing that there was no evidence that the payment was to protect
the directors' position).
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mail by Walt Disney Productions to financier Saul Steinberg.7 Some
commentators also criticize application of the business judgment rule
to the decision to pay greenmail as being too low a standard. These
critics view the rule as an ineffective means of regulating greenmail. 78
ii. Legislation
Four states have enacted legislation regulating greenmail. 79 Of
these states, Arizona, Minnesota, and Wisconsin each prohibit the
redemption of stock at a premium from shareholders owning a certain
percentage of the corporation unless the shareholders approve.80
Nevada delegates the regulation of repurchases to a state commission. s1
The controversial issue of greenmail and its use as a takeover
defense is presently subject to regulation by federal securities laws,
state courts enforcing fiduciary duties, and a number of state statutes.
Many critics, however, view the present scheme as too lenient.

III.

THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL TAX LAW ON HOSTILE

TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOVER DEFENSES
The controversy surrounding hostile takeovers centers on the perception that such acquisitions are encouraged by federal tax laws.2
Accordingly, a brief discussion of some of the tax issues involving
takeovers and defenses follows.
A.

Taxation of Acquisitions in General

The initial tax issue in a corporate acquisition is whether the transaction is a taxable or non-taxable event to the acquiring or selling
corporation. Taxability largely depends on the form of the transaction,
which is a departure from the pervasive doctrine of "substance over
form:"' "The [Internal Revenue] Code distinguishes among taxable
77. Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985).
78. See Gilson, supra note 48, at 331 n.5; Comment, supra note 3, at 1280.
79. Gilson, supra note 48, at 331 n.4. The states are Arizona, Minnesota, Nevada, and
Wisconsin. Id. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
80. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 10-1204A (Supp. 1987) (prohibiting repurchase from over 5%
shareholders holding stock for less than three years); MINN. STAT. § 302A.553, subd. 3 (Supp.
1988) (prohibiting repurchases from over 5% shareholders holding for less than six months);
Wis. STAT. § 180.725(5)(a) (Supp. 1988) (prohibiting repurchases from over 3% shareholders
holding for less than two years).
81. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 463.512, .516 (Supp. 1987).
82. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 199.
83. See B. BITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
1.05, at 1-11 (1987) (discusses general application of the substance
AND SHAREHOLDERS
over form doctrine to the taxation of corporations).
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purchases of common stock, taxable purchases of corporate assets,
The appliand tax-free reorganizations for income tax purposes ....
cable tax rules have been criticized on the grounds that economically
similar acquisition transactions have different Federal tax consequences depending on their legal form."",
To an extent, the Code encourages corporate acquisition via its
nonrecognition reorganization provisions. In a voluntary or negotiated
acquisition, the acquirer might choose to merge with the target corporation under applicable state corporate law. If a merger meets additional requirements under Treasury Regulations and case law,5 the
transaction will be a type "A" reorganization.s Accordingly, the
target's shareholders recognize no gain or loss on the exchange of
their target stock for the acquirer's stock.,
Alternatively, the transaction might be structured as the target
shareholders exchanging their target stock for the voting stock of the
acquirer. Assuming the non-statutory doctrines are again met, this
stock for stock exchange will be a type "B" tax-free reorganization. 8
A typical exchange tender offer of voting stock of the bidder for voting
stock of the target would be a "B" reorganization if 80 percent control
of the voting power of the target is attained.
A third type of acquisitive reorganization is a type "C" reorganization where the target's assets are acquired in exchange for the voting
stock of the acquirer.9 In this transaction, the target corporation
recognizes no gain or loss on the exchange of its assets. 91 Upon the
required liquidation of the target corporation,9 its shareholders recognize no gain or loss on the exchange of the target stock for the voting
stock of the acquirer.93
Regardless of the acquisition form used, the acquirer recognizes
no gain or loss on the exchange of its stock.Y The nonrecognition of

84. TAx TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, suprm note 18, at 17.
85. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (1988) (as amended in 1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (1988) (as
amended in 1962).
86. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
87. Id. § 354(a)(1).
88. See id. § 368(a)(1)(B).

89. Id. § 368(c).
90.
91.

See id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 361(a).

92. Id. § 368(a)(2)(C).
93. Id. § 354(a)(1).
94. Id. § 1032.
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gain or loss in a reorganization is generally preserved in the basis of
the stock received by target's shareholders 95 and in the property or
stock received by the acquiring corporation.6
B.

Taxation of Hostile Takeovers

Through its reorganization provisions, federal tax law influences
corporate acquisitions as a whole. The Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") does not, however, directly distinguish between friendly acquisitions and hostile takeovers. Thus, to the extent that the Code encourages or subsidizes a type of acquisition, that subsidy extends to friendly
as well as hostile takeoversY7 Although the Code does not directly
influence hostile takeovers by distinguishing them from friendly acquisitions, it indirectly influences hostile takeovers by its effect on certain
takeover defenses.
1. Golden Parachutes
Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,98 corporations could
deduct golden parachute payments as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The only requirement was that the payment be a
"reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered." 99 With the 1984 Act's enactment of sections 280G and 4999, Congress took the first step in using the Code
to influence hostile takeover activity. These sections disallow deduction
of certain golden parachute payments and impose a 20 percent excise
tax on their receipt. 1°° The passage of the golden parachute provisions
reflected certain congressional concerns. First, because of their use
as a takeover defense, golden parachutes hindered acquisition activity
and therefore were "strongly discouraged" as a policy matter. 1 1 A
second concern was that golden parachute arrangements caused key
executives to place their own interests above interests of their corporations and shareholders. Congress feared that executives would
perhaps favor a proposed takeover because of lucrative golden

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. 358(a)(1) (exchange basis).
Id. 362(b) (transferred basis).
TAX TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 5.
See the 1984 Act, supra note 31.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
See the 1984 Act, supra note 31, at § 67(a), (b)(1).
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION

OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 199 (Comm. Print

1984)

[hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

1984
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parachute payments. 1 2 Of final importance to Congress was the fear
that managers received too great a portion of the overall takeover
proceeds at the expense of the shareholders.Y3
Congress addressed these concerns by defining undesirable payments and attempting to discourage them by disallowing deduction
by the payor and penalizing the recipient with an excise tax. Accordingly, the golden parachute provisions attempt to implement congressional intent with detailed, precise statutory language. Section 280G
generally disallows any deduction for "excess parachute payments."' 4
Furthermore, section 4999 imposes a 20 percent excise tax on the
receipt of excess parachute payments. °5 An "excess parachute payment" is defined as "the excess of any parachute payment over the
portion of the base amount allocated to such payment."16 "Parachute
payments" are compensatory payments paid to "disqualified individuals" under certain contingent circumstances,01 and certain compensatory payments that are deemed parachute payments because they
violate "generally enforced securities laws or regulations."'ll "Disqualified individuals" are defined as those individuals who perform personal
services for the payor corporation, as either an employee or independent contractor, and who are an "officer, shareholder or highly-compen-

102.
103.

Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 200. Congress's intent can be summarized as follows:

In almost any takeover situation, be it hostile or friendly, acquiring company in
theory will pay a maximum amount and no more. To the extent of that amount,
directly or indirectly, must be paid to executives and other key personnel of the

target corporation, because of the existence of golden parachutes or similar arrangements, there is less for the shareholders of that corporation. Congress decided to

discourage transactions which tended to reduce amounts which might otherwise
be paid to target corporation shareholders.
Id.
104.
105.

I.R.C. § 280G(a).
Id. § 4999(a).

106. Id. § 280G(b)(1).
107. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(A).
108.

Id. § 280G(b)(2)(B). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added the "generally enforced"

modifier to "securities laws or regulations" and also placed the burden of proof on the government
to show a violation. See the 1986 Act, supra note 9, at § 1804(j). This amendment was intended

to limit the applicability of such deemed parachute payments. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 921, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 921. "[Tihe treatment of a securities law violation as a
parachute payment does not apply if the violation is merely technical in character or is not
materially prejudicial to shareholders or potential shareholders." JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., EXPLANATION OF TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1984 AND OTHER RECENT TAX LEGISLATION 30 (Comm. Print 1987).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss4/5

16

Lustig:
The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law in Regulating Hostile Ta
I.R.C. § 5881 EXCISE TAX ON GREENMAIL

sated individual" of such corporation. 109 Payments are considered
parachute payments if they are contingent on a change in control of
either the corporation or its assets, and if the present value of the
compensatory payments exceeds three times the disqualified person's
"base amount." 110 When the agreement is entered into within one year
of the change of control, there is a presumption, rebuttable only by
clear and convincing evidence, that the agreement is "contingent.""',
In computing parachute payments under section 280G(b)(2)(A) (but
not payments deemed "golden parachutes" because they violate securities laws), the amount is reduced to the extent the recipient shows
by clear and convincing evidence that the payments are reasonable
compensation."2 Thus through these complicated provisions, the statute attempts to isolate potential abusive transactions from bona-fide
transactions.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made significant changes limiting the
applicability of golden parachute provisions. The first change provided
that parachute payments do not include payments to or from qualified
employee plans."13 Congress also exempted corporations that qualify
as a "small business corporation" under section 1361(b) immediately
before the control change. An additional exemption is provided for a
corporation, whose stock is not "readily tradeable on an established
securities market,"14 as long as 75 percent of the outstanding voting
power approves the payments after adequate disclosure of all material
facts."', These amendments reflect Congress's attempts to isolate the
abusive situations the provisions were intended to prevent.
The golden parachute provisions are not, however, solely applicable
to hostile takeovers."16 Rather than focusing on a hostile change in
control, the provisions require only a change in control, therefore
including friendly acquisitions as well as hostile takeovers. Depending
on the circumstances, the golden parachute provisions may either encourage or discourage a hostile takeover. For example, if management

109.

I.R.C. § 280G(c)(2)(A). '"ighlycompensated" is defined as being in either the highest

paid 1% of employees or the highest paid 250 employees. Id.
110. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(A). Generally, "base amount" is the disqualified individual's average
salary for the five years preceding the change in control. Id. §§ 280G(b)(3)(A), (d)(1),(2).
111. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(C).

112. Id. § 280G(b)(4).
113.
referred
114.
115.
116.

See id. § 280G(b)(6)( as added by § 1804Q) of the 1986 Act). The employee plans
to are under I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 403(a), 410(a).
See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 ACT, supra note 101, at 199.
Id. § 280G(b)(5) (as added by § 1804() of the 1986 Act).
See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 1984 AcT, supra note 101, at 200.
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favors an acquisition of its company because of the lucrative golden
parachute payoff,1 17 then acquisition becomes less favorable to the
acquirer, who can no longer deduct the payment, and the managers,
who must pay an additional 20 percent tax and accordingly receive a
lesser amount. On the other hand, if the golden parachute plan is
being considered strictly as a takeover defense,118 then these provisions
will make golden parachutes a less attractive defense. Theoretically,
this favors the acquirer in a hostile takeover by reducing the target's
available defenses.
2. Poison Pils
Another takeover defense influenced by the Code is the "poison
pil" plan. In a poison pill plan, target shareholders have the right to
purchase stock of the issuer or an acquirer at a big discount in the
event of a takeover."1 9 Several potential tax issues arise from the use
of a poison pill plan. = ° The first issue involves the adoption of the
plan, which is typically structured as a dividend to the common
shareholders of the poison pill right or warrant.HI Because the rights
are highly contingent, speculative, non-transferable, and non-exercisable, an issue arises as to whether or not the rights even constitute
property.1 2If the rights are considered property, then the Code treats
distribution of the stock rights as a tax-free distribution by the corporation of its own stock m to its shareholders with respect to their
stock. TM

117. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
118. See supra text accompanying note 32.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
120. Dionne, IRS Ruling that PoisonPills BarSome Tax-Free ReorganizationsStirs Controversy, 39 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 679, 680 (May 9, 1988).
121. Rosen, Selected Target Defense Strategies, in TAx STRATEGIES FOR LEVERAGED
BuYouTs AND OTHER CORPORATE AcQuIsrrIONS AND FINANCINGS 237, 251-53 (1986).

122. Id. at 253-54. If the rights are not property, then they are treated as a new term of
the outstanding common stock contingent upon the occurrence of subsequent events. Id. Consequently, shareholders have nonrecognition of tax as either an exchange of stock in a tax-free
recapitalization, I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E) (1988), or as an exchange of outstanding common for new
common with this contingent term. Id. at § 1036(a); Rosen, supra note 121, at 254.
123. Section 305(d)(1) provides that stock includes rights to acquire a corporation's stock.
I.R.C. § 305(d)(1); see also Dionne, supra note 120, at 682 (stating corporate tax bar's belief
that the rights are a new attribute of outstanding common stock); Rosen, supra note 121, at

254 (even if rights were treated as property, distribution of rights would be a non-taxable
distribution under I.R.C. § 305).
124. I.R.C. § 305(a) generally provides for nonrecognition of a stock distribution by a

corporation of its own stock to its shareholders with respect to their stock. I.R.C. § 305(a).
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Notwithstanding the issues concerning the adoption of a poison pill
plan, a more severe problem arises if the pill is determined to be
property. For purposes of a type "B" or "C" reorganization, the poison
pill property rights might be considered "boot." Boot is property other
than voting stock and therefore impermissible consideration in both
type "B" and "C" reorganizations.1 2Therefore, a corporation with an
outstanding poison pill plan may not be allowed to use its common
stock to acquire other corporations and qualify as a type "B" or "C"
reorganization.26 For example, in a recent private letter ruling,m a

publicly traded corporation with a poison pill plan attached to its
common stock sought to acquire a target corporation through a "reverse triangular merger" form of tax-free reorganization. In the
reorganization, one of the acquirer's subsidiaries was merged into the
target. The target shareholders received the acquirer's common stock
(including the poison pill), and the acquirer received target stock from
its subsidiary. The IRS held that the proposed transaction qualified
as a reorganization, despite the fact that the poison pill rights were
property and taxable as boot.m The real concern raised by this letter
ruling is that treatment of poison pill rights as property other than
stock will disqualify a type "B" and possibly a type "C" reorganization. 13° A type "B" reorganization would be disqualified because it

requires the acquirer's voting stock be the sole consideration in ex-

125. Rosen, supra note 121, at 261. Although any amount of boot will disqualify a "B"
reorganization, a limited amount of boot is permitted in a "C" reorganization. I.R.C. §
368(a)(2)(B).
126. Dionne, supra note 120, at 679; Rosen, supra note 121, at 261.
127. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-08-081 (Dec. 3, 1987), I.R.S. Ltr. Rulings Rep. (CCH) No. 575
(Mar. 7, 1988). Although private letter rulings are only binding on the party requesting them
and may not be used or cited as precedent according to I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3), such rulings are
often helpful in predicting the Internal Revenue Service's interpretations on provisions and has
been used by courts in such a manner. See M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
3.03, at 3-45 (1981).
128. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E); see also B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 83, 14.15,
at 14-62 (further discussion of reverse triangular mergers).
129. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-08-081 (Dec. 3, 1987), I.R.S. Ltr. Rulings Rep. (CCII) No. 575
(Mar. 7, 1988). Boot is generally a consideration that is not stock or securities and therefore
does not generally qualify for non-recognition treatment. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra
note 83,
14.31, at 14-117. Boot is generally allowed in an otherwise qualified reorganization
although the recipient of boot is taxed. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1). In the instant letter rtling, the value
of the rights was so small due to the contingent nature of the plan that the gain was probably
de minimis. Dionne, supra note 120, at 681.
130. Dionne, supra note 120, at 680; Schmedel, Poison-PillRights May Add a Taint of
Tax to Stock in Takeovers, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
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change for the target's stock. 131 For purposes of a "B" reorganization,
"solely for voting stock" means solely for voting stock and stock rights;
warrants are not stock. 1 2 Although a "C" reorganization also has a
solely for voting stock requirement, 1 ' the statutory "boot relaxation
rule" 1" allows a limited amount of consideration other than voting
stock to be used in a "C" reorganization. Accordingly, a "C" reorganization is less likely than a "B" reorganization to be disqualified by the
acquiring corporation's use of common stock with poison pill rights
attached.
In response to pressure from corporate lawyers, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") announced that it would regard the adoption of
a poison pill as a tax-free event. Furthermore, the IRS will not treat
poison pill rights as separate property for purposes of section 368.15
3.

Greenmail

Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was an issue as to the
deductibility of greenmail payments by a target corporation for the
repurchase of its stock from a corporate raider. Although a corporation's repurchase of its own stock is generally a non-deductible capital
expenditure,136 deductions were allowed in extraordinary cir37 a
cumstances. In Five Star Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,1
corporation repurchased the shares of a 50 percent shareholder. The
consideration used for the repurchase was a judgment for the corporation against the shareholder."8 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
allowed the corporation a current deduction for the repurchase as an
ordinary and necessary business expense." 9 In reaching its holding,
the court found that had the redeemed shareholder not been removed,
the corporation would have been forced into liquidation; consequently,

131.
132.
133.

See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B).
Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 198-99 (1942).
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C).

134. Id. § 368(a)(2)(B).
135.

Sheppard, IRS Will Allow Tax-Free Creation of Poison Pills, 41 TAx NOTES (TAX
258 (Oct. 17, 1988); see also New York State Bar Association, N.Y.S.B.A. Tax
Section Considers Tax Treatment of "Poison Pills," 14 TAX MGMT. WASH. TAX REV. 139
(Sept. 1988).
ANALYSTS)

136.

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF

THE TAX REFORM AcT
OF THE

137.
138.
139.

OF 1986, 277 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL

EXPLANATION

1986 AcT].
355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 725.
Id. at 727.
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there would have
been insufficient assets for the corporation to meet
140
its obligations.

4
Although other courts have limited the holding of Five Star,11
many target companies apparently deducted greenmail payments
under the authority of Five Star.'4 Congress became concerned that
greenmail payments were being deducted as ordinary and necessary
business expenses.'43 In the 1986 Act, Congress added a new section
to specifically disallow deductions for amounts paid by a corporation
to redeem its own stock.14 Congress intended this provision to be
construed broadly enough to include such transactions as standstill

agreements.1

4

,

Payments discharging certain contractual obligations,

such as settlement of litigation, however, are beyond the scope of the
provision if the corporation can show the payments are not in consideration for the shareholder's stock or related expenses.1 46 In addition
to covering the payment for stock and related premiums, Congress
intended the provision to apply to all related fees and expenses. 47
As with golden parachute provisions, disallowance of redemption
expenses is not just applicable to hostile takeovers. Although it is
instead intended to apply to all redemptions, the provision clearly
affects hostile takeovers. The economic cost to a target paying greenmail is now increased because of the loss of the possible tax savings
created by the former tax deduction. Accordingly, to the extent greenmail as a takeover defense is economically less attractive, the Code
adversely influences the decision to pay greenmail.
The income tax consequences to the greenmail recipient depend
on the form of the transaction. If greenmail is in the form of a redemption, it will either be treated as a sale or exchange or treated as a
distribution.'4 Treatment depends on how much stock is redeemed,
the greenmailer's relationship with the target, and the greenmailer's
relationship with the target's shareholders after redemption. Assuming
all of the greemailer's stock is redeemed, the transaction will gener-

140. Id.
141.

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 ACT, supra note 136, at 277 n.8.

142. Id. at 277; Forman, Using the Tax Code to Fend Off CorporateTakeover 'Sharks', 26
TAX NoTEs (TAX ANALYSTS) 1162, 1164 (Mar. 18, 1985).
143. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 ACT, supra note 136, at 277-78.

144. I.R.C. § 1620) (added by § 613 of the 1986 Act).
145. See supra text accompanying note 45 (discussion of standstill agreements).
146. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-168, -169, reprinted in 1986-3
C.B., 168-69.
147.

See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 ACT, supra note 136, at 278.

148. I.R.C. §§ 302(a), (d).
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ally be a sale or exchange of the stock. 49 After reducing the proceeds
by the greenmailer's basis in the stock, 15° the greenmailer will have
a realized gain or loss.'r' Any gain is generally a capital gain, 152 which

was subject to preferential tax treatment prior to 1987.153 When the
greenmail payment is treated as a distribution,'5 the payment is generally taxable to the recipient shareholder as a dividend. 1 5 If the

greenmail payment is structured as a standstill agreement where the
shareholder receives payment for refraining from purchasing additional
shares for a period of time, then the payment should be gross income
to the greenmailer.as
IV.

SECTION 5881 ExciSE TAx ON GREENMAIL

A. Prelude to the Enactment of Section 5881
As a result of congressional concern that federal tax law was somehow influencing hostile takeovers, several takeover-related tax bills
were introduced. 15 7 In 1985, Congress held hearings on the tax treatment of hostile takeovers.'5 The hearings, which were held prior to
the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, reflected the particular
concern that tax law encouraged greenmail. Congress believed that
the target deducted the payment and the greenmailer received preferential capital gains treatment on the receipt of greenmail. 69 This concern was reflected in proposed bills that denied deductions for green-

149. Id. §§ 302(a), (b)(3).
150. Assuming the greenmailer purchased the target's stock, the basis will be the cost, or
purchase price. Id. § 1012.
151. Id. § 1001.
152. Id. § 1222. Generally, a greenmaier treats its stock as a capital asset under I.R.C.
§ 1221, although there is a possible argument that the raider is in the business of greenmail,
and accordingly, the stock would not be a capital asset under I.R.C. § 1221(1). Forman, supra
note 142, at 1164.
153. I.R.C. § 1202 (1986), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 301(c),
100 Stat. 2085, 2216, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2085, 2216.
154. See I.R.C. § 302(d) (1988).
155. Id. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a). A dividend is a distribution by a corporation to its shareholders
to the extent of its earnings and profits, as determined under I.R.C. § 312. See id. §§ 312, 316.
156. See id. § 61(a)(1) (gross income includes compensation received).
157. See S. 420, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. Sl151-01 (1985); S. 476, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S1579 (1985); S. 632, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S2789
(1985); H.R. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H410-09 (1985).
158. See TAx TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supra note 18.
159.

Id. at 73 (statement of Senator Boren).
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mail payments 1' 6 and imposed an excise tax on greenmail recipients.161
While subsequent passage of the 1986 Act resolved deductibility issues
and repealed capital gain preferences, concern over greenmail remained.
More recently, the Corporate Raider Tax Act of 1987 was proposed
in response to the spate of hostile takeovers in recent years
and the devastation they bring.
Wall Street's merger and acquisition shops are working
overtime. These paper entrepreneurs are engaged in a "feeding frenzy."... Regrettably, the people who really benefit
from hostile takeovers are the raiders, the investment bankers, and the merger lawyers.
Obviously, this legislation will not stop hostile takeovers,
but it will discourage these manipulative raids. It's time that
Congress acted to protect American workers, American competitiveness, and the American economy from the greed and
crimes of these raiders.162
This bill again proposed an excise tax on greenmail to discourage
corporate raiders.16 Congress also proposed broader provisions to discourage hostile takeovers as a whole. These provisions included a
mandatory election to step-up the basis of assets acquired for any
hostile stock purchaseI64 and a denial of deduction for any interest on
indebtedness incurred in a hostile purchase of stock or assets.'6

160. S. 632, supra note 157, at § 2. The IRS had always taken the position that greemnail
payments were not deductible and urged the Senate to confirm the IRS's position by statute.
TAx TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 118 (testimony of Ronald A.

Pearlman, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) Department of Treasury).
Presumably the enactment of I.R.C. § 1620) in the 1986 Act accomplished this concern. See

supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
161. S. 420, supra note 157, at § 1; S. 476, supra note 157, at § 1; H.R. 100, supra note
157, at § 1.
162. H.R. 2995, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. E3043 (1987) (statement of the
bill's sponsor, Rep. Byron L. Dorgan).
163. Id. § 2, at E3044.
164. Id. § 3, at E3044.
165. Id. § 4, at E3044. The mandatory § 338 election was intended to deprive the hostile

acquirer of being able to choose whether or not to increase or "step-up" its basis in the target.
While there are circumstances where the election to step-up basis might be beneficial to the

acquirer, there are also times when the step-up is not beneficial because of the additional tax
liabilities arising from the election. TAx TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supranote

18, at 39. Accordingly, by taking the choice away from the hostile acquirer, this provision would
make the decision to acquire a corporation in a hostile purchase economically less attractive.
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The proposals made in the Corporate Raider Tax Act of 1987 were
included by the House Ways and Means Committee in the Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987.16 The House Ways and Means Committee
clearly intended these provisions to discourage hostile takeovers as a
whole:
The Committee believes that corporate acquisitions that lack
the consent of the acquired corporation are detrimental to
the general economy as well as to the welfare of the acquired
corporation's employees and community. The Committee
therefore believes it is appropriate not only to remove tax
incentives for corporate acquisitions, but to create tax disincentives for such acquisitions. In addition, the committee
believes that taxpayers should be discouraged from realizing
short-term profits by acquiring stock in a public tender offer
and later being redeemed by the corporation in an effort by
the corporation to avert the hostile takeover. 167
The Senate, however, did not include the hostile takeover provisions from the House version in its version of the Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987.118 After the Conference Committee reconciled the two
versions, only the greenmail excise tax remained
in the bill. President
69
Reagan subsequently signed the bill into law.1
B.

The Statutory Elements
1. What is Greenmail?

Section 5881 imposes a 50 percent excise tax on the recipient of
greenmail7 ° In order for the excise tax to apply, "greenmail" must
exist. The Code defines greenmail as any acquisition that is not made
on the same terms to all shareholders. Additionally, the corporation

The proposed disallowance of the interest expense addressed the concern that many takeovers
are financed by 'Junk bonds" and other risky, highly 'leveraged" instruments and that the Code
subsidizes hostile takeovers by allowing a deduction for interest. See I.R.C. § 163(a).
166. H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 10142-10144, in PRENTICE HALL FEDERAL
TAXES (P-H Oct. 30, 1987) (as reported by the Ways and Means Comm. on Oct. 26, 1987).
167. H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1086, reprintedin 1987 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMiN. NEWS 2313-1, 2313-701.
168. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX PROVISIONS OF
OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1987 (Comm. Print 1987), reprintedin PRENTICE
HALL FEDERAL TAXES § 4 (P-H Dec. 10, 1987).
169. I.R.C. § 5881 (added by § 10228 of Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10228, 101 Stat. 417-18
(1987)).
170. Id. § 5881(a).
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must have repurchased its stock from a shareholder who held the
stock for less than two years and who made or threatened to make a
tender offer. 171
a. Acquisition
The Code defines greenmail as including "any consideration," 17
including money and other property. The statute further requires that
consideration be for the "acquisition" of the shareholder's stock.' 73
Although the statute used the term "acquisition," this clearly includes
"redemption" transactions. 174 Additionally, the statute anticipates the
use of a related entity, such as a subsidiary of the corporation, to
circumvent the acquisition requirement. The Code prevents such circumvention by including "direct and indirect acquisitions."'175
Unlike the disallowed deduction for redemption payments, 76 the
statute apparently does not apply to payments under a standstill agreement. Because such payments are not made for acquisition of the
shareholder's stock, they apparently escape the definition of green7
mail. 1
b. Holding Period
The statutory definition of greenmail requires the shareholder to
have held the redeemed stock for less than two years. 178 The statute
does not provide for the shareholder who acquired blocks of stock
over a period of time. Therefore, when the shareholder holds some
shares less than two years and other shares longer than two years,
the corporation could possibly redeem the stock in two steps. The
first step could be a redemption, at a premium, of the older shares.

171.

Id. § 5881(b).

172.
173.

Id.
Id.

174. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 970-71, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2313-1245, 2313, 1716-17.

CODE CONG.

175.

I.R.C. § 5881(b).

176. See id. § 162(1); see also supratext accompanying notes 143-46 (discussing disallowance
of deductions for redemption payments and standstill agreements).
177. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 [hereinafter "the 1988 Act"]
does not appear to change this result because the Act only expands the character of the greenmail
that is subject to the excise tax, i.e., the character is expanded from "gain" to "gain or other
income." I.R.C. § 5881(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2004(o)(A) (1988). The definition
of greenmail, however, is still defined to be a result of the acquisition by a corporation of its
stock. See infra note 194 and text accompanying notes 193-99 for discussion of the 1988 Act.
178. I.R.C. § 5881(b)(1). The holding period is determined under I.R.C. § 1223. Id.
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This apparently falls outside of the holding period. The second step
could be a redemption on terms available to all shareholders. Of course
the IRS would likely challenge such transactions under the "step transaction doctrine."179
c. Tender Offer Element
Another element in the statutory definition of greenmail is that at
some time during the two year period preceding the acquisition, the
shareholder, or a person "related" to or acting "in concert" with the
shareholder, must have made or threatened to make a "public tender
offer" for the corporate stock. 18° This element apparently adds the
hostile takeover taint to the provision. The Code defines "related
person" as including certain relationships between persons that result
in disallowed losses under the Code."s" Although not defined in the
statute, "in concert" commonly applies to situations where one person
"acts with another to bring about some preconceived result."18 Therefore, a shareholder cannot escape application of this provision by circumventing the "related" provision through use of an "unrelated" accomplice under an agreement.
A more problematic issue is defining a "public tender offer." Public
tender offer is defined as "any offer to purchase or otherwise acquire
stock or assets in a corporation if such offer was or would be required
to be filed or registered with any Federal or State agency regulating
1
securities. "'
The first problem with this definition is that "tender
offer" is not statutorily defined under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934:
Although the Williams Act purports to regulate the making
of tender offers for public companies in the United States,
it does not define the term "tender offer." Similarly, when
the SEC issued its rules promulgated under the Williams
Act, it also failed to define "tender offer." Consequently, the
judiciary has played a significant role in developing a definition of the term, based upon the purposes reflected in the
Act's legislative history. 84

179. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 83, 1.05, at 1-16.
180. I.R.C. § 5881(b)(2).
181. The referenced Code sections under which the losses would be disallowed are I.R.C.

§§ 267, 707(b). Id. § 5881(c)(2).
182.
183.
184.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (5th ed. 1979).
I.R.C. § 5881(c)(1).
R. FERRARA & M. BROWN, supr note 5, at 22 (emphasis added).
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The federal tax law inherits the interpretation problems encountered under federal securities law. In addition, the Code's definition
of "public tender offer" is much broader than the Williams Act requirements.,, The Code's definition is broader because it encompasses any
offer "required to be filed or registered with any Federal or State
agency regulating securities."'1
Compounding the problem of determining when a tender offer is
actually made is the additional inclusion of 'threatened" tender offer
in the Code's greenmail definition. 18 The potential breadth of the term
'threatened tender offer," as well as the lack of guidance under the
Code, concerns those in the mergers and acquisitions field.'88 One
concern involves the common practice by 5 percent owners of disclosing
the possibility of increasing their ownership through a tender offer,
even though the shareholder has no intention of making the offer. The
purpose behind this disclosure is to ensure full disclosure. Commentators are concerned that such disclosure should not be considered a
'threatened" tender offer because no actual threat has been made.'8
Indeed, if such disclosures were held to be threatened tender offers,
tension would arise between the federal securities law's goal of full
disclosure and this overly broad tax provision.
One suggestion offered to provide guidance is to analogize the
'threat" of a tender offer to the Code's provision for involuntary conversion, where one of the triggers to nonrecognition is the 'threat"
of condemnation. 90 In a ruling under the involuntary conversion provision that determined whether a threatened condemnation occurred,
the IRS required official notice that the government intended to condemn the taxpayer's property.' 9' Thus, the greenmail statute could
require formal notice from the raider to the target. This suggested
analogy, however, may not be appropriate because the involuntary
conversion provision is a nonrecognition provision and is accordingly

185. Dionne, Will the Greenmail Tax Apply to White Knights?, 39 TAx NOTES (TAx
1145, 1148 (June 6, 1988).
186. I.R.C. § 5881(c)(1). With respect to the state registration requirement, the decision
of the highest court of the state should be determinative as to state law under the doctrine of
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
187. I.R.C. § 5881(b)(2)(C).
188. Dionne, supra note 185, at 1148.
189. Letter from attorneys Peter I. Faber & S. Austrian to 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy (Apr. 12, 1988), reprintedin TAX NOTES WEEKLY
MICROFICHE, Doe. 88-4276 (May 9, 1988).
190. Dionne, supra note 185, at 1148; see also I.R.C. § 1033(a) (generally providing for the
nonrecognition of gain from an involuntary conversion of property).
191. Rev. Rul. 58-557, 1958-2 C.B. 402, 403.

ANALYSTS)
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very narrowly construed. In contrast, the greenmail provision is intended for broad application. Although an official notice provision may
not be effective, there should be a safe harbor provision so that some
predictability exists in the mergers and acquisitions field. '1 The obvious problem in establishing a bright line rule is that once established,
one could manipulate this rule to avoid the statute and thus avoid its
intended broad application.
2. Imposition of Excise Tax
Once the statutory elements of greenmail are met, a 50 percent
excise tax is imposed on the "gain" realized by the greenmail recipient. 1 The Technical Corrections Act of 1988 expands this to "gain
or other income realized."'9 The excise tax overrides any nonrecognition provision. 195 Furthermore, no income tax deduction is allowed to
the recipient for payment of the greenmail excise tax. 19
The Code imposes the greenmail excise tax in addition to income
tax. 1 Therefore, assuming the recipient is in the highest marginal
tax bracket for individuals (28 percent)'9 or corporations (34 percent),'9 the effective tax rate of combined income and greenmail excise
tax will be as high as 78 percent and 84 percent for individuals and
corporations, respectively.
192. See Dionne, supra note 185, at 1148-49 (noting the confusion in the mergers and
acquisitions field over I.R.C. § 5881).
193. I.R.C. § 5881(a).
194. H.R. 4333, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 204(m) (1988) (emphasis added). Dividend income
is specifically included in other income. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1988, 423 (H.R. 4333 & S. 2238) (Comm. Print 1988)
[hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1988]. Because the

provision as enacted was applicable only to gain realized, which I.R.C. § 1001(a) generally
relates to a sale or exchange, and not other types of income such as dividends, there appeared
to be a way to circumvent the excise tax by structuring the acquisition of the shareholder's
stock in a way that would create dividend income rather than gain from sale or exchange of

property. One transaction that was structured this way to avoid the statute was to issue warrants
rather than cash as the consideration for the shareholder's stock. Dionne, Tax-Free Greenmail
Scheme Foiled, 39 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1147 (June 6, 1988). The warrant holder was

treated as still owning the stock under the § 318 attribution rules and taxed as a receiving
dividend. I.R.C. § 302(d). This apparent loophole has been detected by the 1988 Act. See
DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1988, supra, at

423.

195. I.R.C. § 5881(d).
196. Id. § 275(a)(6), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, § 10228, 101 Stat. 1330.
197. The greenmail excise tax is imposed by Chapter 54 of the Code. This is consistent
with the intent underlying the excise tax as imposed by the Corporate Raider Tax Act of 1987.
See supra text accompanying note 162.

198. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d).
199.

Id. § 11(b).
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C. White Knight Problem
An amendment in the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1988 10 (the "1988 Act") creates a new wrinkle to existing definitional
and interpretive problems under the section 5881 greenmail tax.' 1
When a "white knight ' 2 2 succeeds in acquiring control of the target
through a competing tender offer, the white knight might seek to buy
the initial bidder's shares at a premium to dispose of a potentially
troublesome shareholder. The greenmail tax as originally enacted in
the 1987 Act would not apply to this transaction because the target
neither directly nor indirectly acquired the stock from its shareholder.23 Instead, a majority shareholder has acquired the stock from a
minority shareholder.
The 1988 Act expands the definition of greenmail to "any corporation (or any person acting in concert with such corporation).'" 20 This
expansion raises the question of whether a white knight, who purchases the initial bidder's stock, is acting in concert with the target
corporation. 25 The legislative history of the 1988 Act provides no
explanation of the scope or meaning of this change. There are two
possible interpretations of the application to white knights in this
expanded definition. One view is that the proposed change is intended
to apply when a third party acts as a "conduit" for the acquisition and
eventual return of the stock to the target corporation. Based on this
view, the white knight's purchase from the greenmailer should not be
treated differently from a sale on the open market because the white
knight is not a conduit for the return of the stock to the 2target.
6
Accordingly, the excise tax should not apply to the purchase. 0
Under a contrary view, the expanded definition of greenmail would
cover payment by a white knight to an intended bidder.* 7 This view
is apparently based on the "broadly drafted language" of the expanded
definition to include consideration transferred by any person acting in
concert with the issuing or target corporation. Under common usage
of in "concert,"' 08 any action by the white knight that is planned with

200.
201.

Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2004(o)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
See Dionne, supra note 185, at 1147.

202. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
203. I.R.C. § 5881(b).
204. Id. (amended by § 2004(o)(1)(B)(i) of the 1988 Act) (emphasis added).
205. Dionne, supra note 185, at 1147; Willens, Greenmail Tax Should Not Apply to White
Knights, 39 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 623, 623-24 (May 2, 1988) (letter to the editor).

206. Willens, supra note 205, at 623-24.
207.
208.

Dionne, supra note 185, at 1147.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
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the target corporation apparently falls within the statute. Accordingly,
if the white knight's purchase of the bidder's stock is pursuant to an
agreement with the target, such purchase would be greenmail if all
other elements are met.
Because the Internal Revenue Service has not taken a position on
this issue and is only in the early stages of drafting regulations on
section 5881 as originally enacted,2 prompt resolution appears unlikely.
D.

The 1988 Act

The 1988 Act also confers jurisdiction over the greenmail excise
tax to the United States Tax Court by subjecting the tax to the Code's
deficiency procedures.210 Additionally, the Statement of Managers of
the 1988 Act articulates an exception to the greenmail tax:
[T]he conferees clarify that the greenmail tax does not apply
in a situation where the stock of the taxpayer and all other
shareholders is purchased at the same price, at essentially
the same time and in a transaction which is substantially
the same; that is, all shares are purchased with the same
total present value of consideration per share, whether in
the form of debt, debentures, or cash, with no additional
consideration provided to any selling shareholder.211
This exception appears to allow some flexibility in repurchasing
shares but creates many interpretation problems. For example, what
is "substantially the same?" At what discount rate is the present value
to be calculated? Again, guidance is needed to interpret application
of the greenmail excise tax.
V.

Is SECTION 5881 JUSTIFIED FROM A POLICY STANDPOINT

-

SHOULD THE FEDERAL TAx LAW BE USED TO REGULATE GREENMAIL AND HOSTILE TAKEOVERS?

Prior to the enactment of the greenmail excise tax in the 1987 Act,
the Code did not attempt to distinguish hostile takeovers from other
transactions. Nor did the Code attempt to discourage certain activity
within the context of hostile takeovers. Although the golden parachute
provisions were somewhat aimed at hostile takeovers, the provisions

209.
210.
211.

Dionne, supra note 185, at 1142.
I.R.C. § 5881(e) (added by § 2004(o)(1)(B)(i) of the 1988 Act).
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988).
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are applicable to perceived abuses in any change in control, be it
hostile or friendly. 2 2 Although disallowance of deductions for redemption payments was partially directed at greenmail payments, the disallowance applies to all redemption payments. 213 Finally, the IRS's
initial position that poison pill plans might disqualify certain types of
tax-free reorganizations 214 does not seem to reflect any concern with
hostile takeovers. Rather, the treatment appeared to reflect IRS's
strict construction of the nonrecognition reorganization provisions.
With the new greenmail excise tax, however, the Code for the
first time distinguishes hostile takeovers from other activity, and discourages certain activity associated with hostile takeovers. This section
examines the propriety, from a tax policy perspective, of direct regulation of takeover defenses by the Code through the use of an excise
tax to discourage greenmail.
A.

Does the Greenmail Excise Tax Comply with
Tax Policy Objectives?

From a tax policy perspective, taxes are generally viewed in terms
of equity and efficiency.25 The equity analysis is divided into vertical
and horizontal equity. Vertical equity occurs when the cost of government is distributed fairly by income levels.216 Under the principle of
horizontal equity, taxpayers in approximately the same economic circumstances should share the same cost of government, i.e., the tax
burden.217 The general principle in an efficient tax system is that "the
tax system should minimize the extent to which individuals alter their
economic behavior so as to avoid paying tax."218
1. Vertical Equity
Because of the resources necessary to engage in greenmail, such
activity is generally limited to high-income individuals and companies.
Therefore, although the "flat" 50 percent tax may appear regressive
and unfair to lower-income taxpayers, the tax really only applies to
high-income groups. Accordingly, the tax is effectively progressive
and does not violate the principle of vertical equity.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
See supra text accompanying notes 125-34.
See J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (5th ed. 1987).
Id.
Id.
D. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 46 (2d ed. 1984).
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2. Horizontal Equity
Applying the policy goal of horizontal equity is more problematic.
Two shareholders with identical stockholdings and economic incomes
can have their shares redeemed at a premium. If one shareholder
acquired the stock within two years of the redemption and threatens
or makes a tender offer, then that shareholder will be subject to the
tax. Accordingly, two taxpayers in approximately the same economic
circumstances are taxed differently. This violation of horizontal equity
is a common criticism of excise taxes, because in keeping with the
intent of the tax, only taxpayers engaging in the targeted activity are
219
taxed.
3. Efficiency
Because the purpose of the greenmail excise tax is to discourage
greenmail payment, the tax is clearly intended to alter the economic
behavior of taxpayers. Accordingly, the excise tax violates the principle of efficiency. Such violation always results from any tax intended
to discourage or encourage economic behavior.2
When evaluated against the tax policy goals of vertical equity,
horizontal equity, and efficiency, the greenmail excise tax only satisfies
the objective of vertical equity. These goals raise the broader question
of whether it is appropriate to use the Code to encourage or discourage
non-tax economic and social behavior.
B.

Should the InternalRevenue Code be Used to Regulate Non-Tax
Economic and Social Behavior?
If all proposals encouraging some worthwhile social activity through the tax system were adopted, the tax system
would be left in shambles, incapable of performing its primary function of financing government equitably and with
healthy economic growth. Yet the tax system now contains
many provisions that have few ties with raising revenue and
with measuring income.221

In addition to raising revenue, the Code has long been used to
encourage certain economic and social conduct through exclusions from
tax, deductions, credits, and preferential tax rates.2 The Code also

219. J. PEcHmAN, supm note 215, at 199.
220. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 138 (1973).
221. Kurtz, Tax Incentives: Their Use and Misuse, 20 MAJOR TAX PLAN 1, 5 (1968).
222. 1 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (Prentice-Hall 1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I].
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discourages certain economic and social behavior through the use of
disallowance of deductions and the imposition of excise taxes.223
Provisions encouraging and discouraging certain economic and social conduct are often cited as a main cause of the Code's undue
complexity. 4 In turn, commentators blame the Code's complexity for
the unfairness in the present tax system:
The resulting tax system is both unfair and needlessly
complex. Moreover, it interferes with economic behavior and,

thus, prevents markets from allocating economic resources
to their most productive uses. Perhaps worse, the complexity
and inequity of the tax system undermine[s] taxpayer morale
a valuable, yet fragile, national asset and a prerequisite

-

for a tax system based on voluntary compliance.22-

Despite the near universal concern over complexity, inefficiency,
and unfairness resulting from use of the Code to implement social and
economic behavior, such use continues, largely as a result of the underlying tax legislative process. 226 Indeed, notwithstanding the stated
intent of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to simplify the Code and remove
incentives that interfere with taxpayers' economic decisions,227 the
Code is still replete with incentives and disincentives. Therefore, the
threshold issue remains whether the Code should be used to regulate

non-tax economic and social behavior.

Perhaps the best example of the use of the Code to encourage behavior is the investment
tax credit, which was repealed in 1986. The investment tax credit allowed taxpayers who
invested in certain property to obtain a credit against their tax liability for a certain prescribed
percentage of the investment. See I.R.C. § 38 (1986), repealed by the 1986 Act, supra note 9,
at § 211. Other examples of incentives include I.R.C. § 170, the deduction for charitable contributions; I.R.C. § 21, the credit for child care expenses necessary for gainful employment; I.R.C.
§ 42, the credit for owners of certain low-income housing. See I.R.C. §§ 21, 42, 170.
223. See S. SURREY, supra note 220, at 155. For example, no deduction is allowed for
illegal payments such as bribes and kickbacks, nor is any deduction allowed for payment of any
governmental fines resulting from a violation of law. I.R.C. § 162(c), (f). Furthermore, certain
transactions involving tax exempt private foundations trigger an excise tax on persons engaging
in the proscribed transaction. Id. §§ 4940-49. Excise taxes are also generally imposed on manufacturers and importers of tobacco products and liquor. Id. §§ 5001, 5701.
224. See TREASURY I, supranote 222, at 2; Ferguson, Luncheon Address: Tax Complexity
and Compliance - One View From the Department of Justice, 30 MAJOR TAX PLAN 871 (1978);
Comm. on Tax Policy (1970-1971), New York State Bar Association, Tax Section, A Report on
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325, 345 (1972).
225.

TREASURY I, supra note 222, at 1.

226. See McDaniel, Simplification Symposium - Federal Income Tax Simplification: The
PoliticalProcess, 34 TA L. REV. 27, 28 (1978).
227. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 AcT, supra note 136, at 6.
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1. Tax Incentives
Professor Surrey has suggested an analysis for determining
whether tax incentives should be used to encourage certain activities
or industries or whether the government should provide direct assistance. 2 Surrey asserted that many virtues attributed to using tax
incentives do not withstand scrutiny. For example, one claimed advantage of tax incentives is that they encourage participation by the
private sector in social programs. Surrey countered that the expressed
need only reflects the need for assistance, not whether such assistance
should be through tax incentives or direct governmental assistance.229
Another asserted virtue of tax incentives is that they are simpler than
direct assistance because incentives avoid government bureaucracy.
This is an oversimplification, however, because complex requirements
may be necessary to implement the tax. °
The real advantage to using tax incentives is apparently political.
It is based upon the notion that conservatives like the perceived lessened governmental role, while liberals are happy that social programs
are assisted.23 1 Another political notion is that tax incentives are more
likely to be passed by Congress than direct assistance programs.=
Surrey, however, found these political justifications illusory at best.2 33
Furthermore, Surrey noted the asserted defects of using tax incentives included some taxpayers being rewarded for doing what they
would otherwise do.3 Also, tax incentives often create inequitable
differences between high-income and low-income taxpayers.2 3 5 Perhaps
the biggest problem is that "[t]ax incentives distort the choices of the
marketplace and produce unneutralities in the allocation of resources. "2 Thus, the issue becomes whether the distortion is justified.
Another critical weakness in using tax incentives is that administration of targeted social problems occurs through the legislative process rather than in federal agencies more knowledgeable in the area.23 7

228. S. SURREY, supra note 220, at 126; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy: A Comparisonwith Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 705 (1970).
229. S.SURREY, supra note 220, at 131.
230. Id. at 131-33. Perhaps the charitable contribution requirements in I.R.C. § 170 illustrate

the complexity within incentive provisions. See I.R.C. § 170.
231.

S. SURREY, supra note 220, at 147.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

134.
134-38.
138.
141-42.
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The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees are
responsible for tax legislation, and both are generally unfamiliar with
the areas involved in the incentives. Accordingly, the control over
substantive legislation in non-tax areas becomes bifurcated. Similar
confusion and conflict can arise between the agency normally responsible for administering the particular non-tax area and the Internal
Revenue Service.
Surrey concluded that tax incentives should only be used when
there are clear advantages over direct assistance. He further noted
that such clear advantages are unlikely.2 39
2. Tax Disincentives
Tax disincentives to discourage behavior are used less frequently
than tax incentives.2 ° These disincentives may take the form of disallowed deductions or excise taxes. Some excise taxes are intended to
raise revenue in addition to regulating conduct, and accordingly, are
presumed appropriate.241 For example, excise taxes on alcohol and
tobacco raise revenue because the demand for such products is inelastic, and consumers will generally continue to purchase the product
despite price increases for the excise tax.m
Another situation warranting the use of a regulatory excise tax is
when a taxpayer imposes heavy costs on society and that taxpayer
should arguably bear the cost of such behavior. An example is pollution
by a manufacturer m Professor Surrey urged caution, however, when
excise taxes are used to "shore up other substantive measures .... "4
Without a revenue-raising justification, the same general concerns
involving tax incentives are present.
The use of tax disincentives to discourage certain economic and
social conduct appears more justified than the use of tax incentives.
Congress should, however, observe caution in using the Code for such
regulation. The effectiveness and integrity of the Code, where the
main purpose is to raise revenue, is compromised to the extent that
the Code is used to interfere with non-tax economic and social policy
issues.

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 14243.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 386 n.61.
Id.
See J. PECHBMAN, supra note 215, at 198-99.
Id. at 195-96; S. SURREY, supra note 220, at 336 n.61.
S. SURREY, supra note 220, at 336 n.61.
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If Regulation by the Code Is Appropriate in Some Circumstances,
Is Greenmail Such a Circumstance?

Because the greenmail tax is apparently not intended to raise revenue 5 like the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes and violates tax policy
goals of horizontal equity and efficiency, the only remaining justification for the tax is its use in discouraging undesirable economic or
social behavior. Assuming, arguendo, that it is sometimes appropriate
to use the Code to regulate certain inappropriate economic and social
behavior, to what extent, if any, is greenmail such inappropriate behavior?
Unfortunately, no articulated standard exists to determine when
social or economic behavior is so harmful as to justify a tax disincentive. The legislative history of the greenmail provision is not particularly helpful in determining specific harms of greenmail. Rather than
focusing on greenmail specifically, Congress discussed the broader
issue of the appropriateness of hostile takeovers.246 Ironically, discouraging greenmail limits its use as a takeover defense, thus theoretically favoring hostile takeovers.
Why should greenmail be singled out among all of the other possible
takeover defenses as inappropriate? Persuasive evidence suggests that
greenmail may be harmful to remaining shareholders of the target
corporation.2 7 One concern is that the greenmailer exploits the target
corporation and the remaining shareholders3m A particularly egregious
situation occurs when a "raider" buys a position in a target and, with
no intention of completing a takeover, creates dissention and threatens
to make a bid. The raider undertakes these actions in hopes of the
target management buying out the raider at a premium. The remaining

245. The greenmail excise tax is estimated to provide the Treasury less than $500,000 for
the fiscal years 1988-90. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 1024 app., reprinted
in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-1771.
Indeed, it is ironic that the tax will not raise significant revenue because it was enacted in

a revenue raising act that was supposed to reconcile the national budget. See Letter from Joseph
A. Grundfest, Chairman, Securities Exchange Comm. to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House
Ways & Means Comm. (Oct. 10, 1987), reprinted in Grundfest, Five Reasons to Reject the
Corporate Control Provisions of the House Budget Reconciliation Bill, 37 TAx NOTES (TAx
ANALYSTS) 1271 (Dec. 21, 1987) [hereinafter Grundfest Letter].

For general criticisms of the use of the budget reconciliation process to enact tax bills see
Handler, Budget Reconciliation and the Tax Law: Legislative History or Legislative Hysteria,
37 TAx NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 1259 (Dec. 21, 1987).
246. See generallyTA TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supra note 18 (discussing
hostile takeovers in tax context).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
248. See upra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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shareholders are harmed when the threatening shareholder is redeemed at a premium unavailable to all shareholders. Deception and
exploitation of remaining shareholders arguably should be discouraged
as inappropriate. Another articulated concern involves management
using greenmail to entrench itself at the expense of remaining
shareholders.2 9 Perhaps this conduct should be discouraged because
management has benefitted itself at the expense of remaining shareholders.25
These exploitation and entrenchment concerns are somewhat consistent with the theory underlying the justification of a tax on polluters. Polluters harm society as a whole. To the extent that all stock
traded on the nation's markets is subject to greenmail, the potential
harm from greenmail might also affect society as a whole.
1. Is the Greenmail Tax Drafted Well Enough to Deal Specifically with
Exploitation and Entrenchment Abuses of Greenmail?
Assuming further that exploitation and entrenchment issues of
greenmail involve inappropriate social and economic behavior, does
section 5881 adequately address these issues? Although the 1985 Senate hearings generally acknowledge the need for a carefully drafted
statute,2 1 the greenmail provision is not drafted with the same precision as the golden parachute provisions. In isolating its applicability
to abusive situations, the golden parachute provisions provide safeharbor relief for small corporations, reasonable payments, and pay-

249. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
250.

In addressing the potential harms of greenmail, the pro-greenmail arguments should

also be considered. Some evidence suggests that remaining shareholders eventually benefit from
the payment of greenmail. This benefit might result when the greenmail payment alerts the
market of the target's attractiveness. Eventually a successful takeover occurs with all shareholders receiving a premium. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
251. This concern was articulated as follows:
[I]t is also true that not all hostile mergers are bad .... Sometimes an ineffective
management team needs to be replaced. Sometimes the interests of the shareholders
are not being adequately represented.

So therefore, while there are problems with corporate mergers that need our
attention, we must be careful in crafting a remedy to target the abuses while not
preventing the legitimate economic activity to which I have referred.
I also believe that we should attempt to interfere with the free market as little

as possible in crafting any remedy.
So I think we must be very careful, take a rifle-shot approach in any legislative
remedy that we craft.
TAx TREATMENT OF TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supra note 18; at 73 (statement of Sen. David
L. Boren).
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ments made with shareholder approval. 2 Without safe-harbor provisions, the greenmail provision effectively provides that any greenmailtype payment is per se inappropriate, despite a lack of exploitation
or entrenchment. For example, assume a bidder buys a position in
the target intending to take over the target in a tender offer. Further
assume that subsequent to completion of the tender offer, the bidder
must abandon the takeover due to circumstances beyond the bidder's
control. If the bidder chooses to sell, it will not be entitled to any
premium for the large block of stock even though neither exploitation
nor entrenchment exists. By not allowing for approval by the shareholders, whom the statute intended to protect, the Code effectively
decides the shareholders' best interests. It effectively takes any decision away from the shareholders. For example, even if the shareholders agree that good business reasons exist for paying greenmail, such
transactions will unlikely occur because the recipient will not agree
to greenmail due to the punitive nature of the tax.
Uncertainty over the treatment in the white knight scenario25 also
reflects the over-inclusiveness of this broad provision. Although the
white knight scenario possibly includes an entrenchment issue, it generally does not include an exploitation issue. Clearly, not all white
knight takeovers are abusive. Despite the lack of abusive situations,
the greenmail tax may apply if the white knight buys out the initial
bidder at a premium.
Although the greenmail tax appears to be intended for broad application, it apparently does not include payments under standstill agreeStandstill agreements are very similar to greemnail payments.
ments, 25 except that there is no redemption of shares and the bidder
retains the shares. However, virtually the same exploitation and entrenchment abuses are possible in standstill agreements as with greenmail payments.6
2. Should the Code be Used to Regulate Greenmail When Means of
Regulation Exist Outside the Code?
Aside from regulation by the Code, the payment of greenmail is
also subject to regulation by state courts, the Securities and Exchange
252. In addition to the structural differences, the rate differences between the 20% for
golden parachute payments and 50% for the greenmail are not explained. Perhaps there is an
implicit decision that greenmail is more inappropriate than golden parachutes. Perhaps the
difference is merely an oversight or drafting inconsistency.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.

255. See supra text accompanying note 45.
256. Indeed, the disallowance of deductions for redemption payments includes standstill
agreements as well as greenmail payments. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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Commission, and a small number of state statutes.57 Critics are concerned about duplication of regulatory effort.m Indeed, the greenmail
tax and other proposed hostile takeover provisions evoked concern
from a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission about the
potential intrusion of federal tax law into the nation's securities markets.2-9
The greenmail tax also effectively abrogates decisions made by a
corporation's directors and management. Traditionally, state laws reserved these decisions to corporate directors and management under
the business judgment rule.m Furthermore, the greenmail tax encroaches on those states that have decided to allow payment of greenmail to the shareholder on shareholder approval. 261

257. See supra text accompanying notes 61-81.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 237-38.
259. See Grundfest Letter, supra note 245, at 1271. Although Commissioner Grundfest
qualified his views as being his own and not necessarily those of the SEC, his involvement in
the opposition to the tax legislation is significant by itself.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, and individual commissioners, have
traditionally refrained from commenting on matters that do not arise directly under
the Federal securities laws. These are not, however, traditional times. [The 1987
Act] is also not a traditional tax act.
If the Act becomes law, it will dramatically alter the process by which the
nation's securities markets influence corporate governance and allocate capital in
the private sector.
Accordingly, I trust you will appreciate the unusual circumstances that lead
me to comment on the Act and recommend that its corporate control provisions
be excluded from the ... revenue package currently being considered by Congress.
Id.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
261. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Additionally, the Treasury opposes the
greenmal tax on a policy standpoint. See TAX TREATMENT OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS HEARINGS, supranote 18, at 117 (testimony of Ronald A. Pearlman, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy)
Department of Treasury).
I don't think [the Treasury] want[s] to be in a position of making economic
judgments about whether particular acquisitions, whether they be hostile or
friendly, are good or bad for the economy, if for no other reason than that we
probably don't know.
One thing we think we know, based on some history with the tax law, is that
the more we get the tax law into making those decisions, the more we confuse
the law, and perhaps the more we distort economic behavior.
So what we suggest here in opposition to these [anti-takeover tax] bills is that
as a matter of tax policy we think it is undesirable to try to draw lines that say
that in hostile acquisitions there should be one kind of tax treatment, and in friendly
acquisitions another ....
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CONCLUSION

The current controversy over hostile takeovers and the payment
of greenmail arises from a complicated arena balanced with competing
offensive and defensive strategies. Several defensive strategies, including golden parachutes and poison pills, have already been indirectly
affected by the Code.
Through the new section 5881 excise tax, Congress takes its first
step in using the Code to regulate hostile takeovers. Because this
punitive tax does not isolate potentially abusive from non-abusive situations, the statute is overly broad. Additionally, further guidance is
needed for some statutory definitions, such as the meaning of
"threatened tender offer." Furthermore, the issue of the tax's application to the white knight situation must be resolved.
Moreover, the use of this tax to discourage greenmail is not justified
from a tax policy perspective. The tax violates the policy goals of
horizontal equity and efficiency. Even if these violations are justified
by the harm caused by greenmail, the statute is not drafted specifically
enough to isolate harmful from harmless transactions. Indeed, the
statute apparently does not include the equally abusive standstill
agreement defense. This provision apparently upsets the balance in
the delicate area of hostile takeovers by discouraging the defensive
use of greenmail.
This provision needlessly muddles an already complicated Internal
Revenue Code. Unless use of the Code to further non-tax economic
and social policy goals is carefully guarded, the Code will never be
simple, fair, and effective.
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